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ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENT 25 I 
there are no chairs, but he should see himself as correcting a metaphysical 
error embodied in vulgar usage. What moral should be drawn about other 
attempts that have been made to reconcile apparently revolutionary meta- 
physical theories with ordinary language is a topic that I must leave for 
discussion on another occasion.9 
New College 
Oxford OX1 3BN 
mackie@vax.oxford.ac.uk 
9 I am grateful to several people at Oxford with whom I discussed an early version of 
this paper (especially Robert Frazier, who also commented on a later draft) and to 
Joan Mackie for comments on the penultimate draft. Some material in S 1 and 2 is 
reproduced, with permission from Blackwell Publishers, from my Critical Notice of 
van Inwagen, Material Beings, Philosophical Books 34 (1993) 75-83. 
Paradox without Self-Reference 
STEPHEN YABLO 
Why are some sentences paradoxical while others are not? Since Russell the 
universal answer has been: circularity, and more especially self-reference.1 
Not that self-reference suffices for paradox. Such a view is refuted by the 
work of Godel and Tarski, and by various commonsense examples, such 
as 'For the last time, stop that racket!' and 'So dear Lord to Thee we raise, 
this our hymn of grateful praise'. What many do seem to think is that some 
sort of self-reference, be it direct or mediated, is necessary for paradox. So 
one often hears that the surest way of keeping a language paradox-free is 
to impose an absolute ban on all self-reference. 'This may be using a 
cannon against a fly,' it is said, 'but at least it stops the fly.' 
Except that it does not stop the fly: paradoxes like the Liar are possible in the 
complete absence of self-reference. Imagine an infinite sequence of sentences S1, 
S2, S3, ..., each to the effect that every subsequent sentence is untrue: 
(S1) for all k > 1, Sk is untrue, 
(S2) for all k > 2, Sk is untrue, 
(S3) for all k > 3, Sk is untrue,... 
1Some semantical paradoxes, for instance Grelling's, trade not on self-reference but on 
circularity of other kinds. Self-reference has seemed essential to Liar-like paradox, 
however. This note gives an example of a Liar-like paradox that is not in any way circular. 
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Suppose for contradiction that some Sn is true. Given what Sn says, for all 
k > n, Sk is untrue. Therefore (a) Sn +1 is untrue, and (b) for all k > n+1, Sk 
is untrue. By (b), what Sn +1 says is in fact the case, whence contrary to (a) 
Sn 1 is true! So every sentence Sn in the sequence is untrue. But then the 
sentences subsequent to any given Sn are all untrue, whence Sn is true after 
all! I conclude that self-reference is neither necessary nor sufficient for Liar- 
like paradox. 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003, USA 
syablo@um.cc.umich.edu 
The Earliest Unexpected Class Inspection 
ROY A. SORENSEN 
Memo: From the Chairman to new faculty 
Now that you have settled into your new post, I am required to evaluate your 
teaching performance. The semester is well under way, so the sooner this is 
done, the better. If we were being scientific about sampling your teaching, the 
class observation would be a surprise inspection. Thus reason dictates that 
the visit should occur on the first day that you do not believe it will occur. But 
on reflection, this is an impossible demand. Could I give the inspection next 
Monday? No, because you would realize that Monday is the first available 
unexpected day. What about the next class on Tuesday? Well the previous 
elimination would make Tuesday the first available unexpected day. Hence, 
it falls prey to the previous reasoning. And indeed, parallel reasoning would 
eliminate all of the remaining days. Hence, the earliest unexpected inspection 
is impossible. Since we hired you in a buyer's market, you have obviously 
noted the resemblance to the surprise examination paradox. But you may 
have not noticed that the elimination proceeds in the reverse direction. It is 
odd that such a reversal could be effected by substituting a definite descrip- 
tion ('The event will occur on the first unexpected day') for an existential 
generalization ('The event will occur on an unexpected day'). But that's logic 
for you. Thus I am compelled to take refuge in philosophy department's 
custom of asking you to propose a day for the class visit. 
503 Main Building, Washington Square East 
New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA 
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